The Twentieth Century to Today · 1922 – 1996

Thomas Kuhn

库恩 · Thomas Samuel Kuhn

Paradigms, normal science, scientific revolutions, incommensurability: science is not the accumulation of truth but the succession of world-views. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is among the most cited academic books of the century.

Philosophy of ScienceBirthplace: Cincinnati

After a revolution scientists are responding to a different world.

Source: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, ch. 10

Kuhn was born in Cincinnati to an engineer, studied physics at Harvard, graduated summa cum laude in 1943, worked in a radar laboratory and in Europe during the war, and took his doctorate in physics in 1949. In 1947 Harvard's president Conant asked him to teach history of science to non-scientists, and while preparing Aristotle's physics he had an 'epiphany': Aristotle was not a bad Newton; his physics was coherent within its own framework, using wholly different concepts. He turned to the history of science.

After some years as a Harvard fellow reading Koyré, Piaget, Wittgenstein and Fleck, he went to Berkeley in 1956 and published The Copernican Revolution in 1957. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions appeared in 1962 as a volume of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, a project of logical positivism that the book proceeded to bury. Mature science, it argued, works under a 'paradigm', a community's shared exemplars, theory, methods and standards; 'normal science' is puzzle-solving within it; accumulated anomalies produce 'crisis'; then a new paradigm replaces the old in a 'revolution', a shift like a Gestalt switch that evidence and logic cannot compel, the old and new being 'incommensurable'. After a revolution scientists 'work in a different world'.

The book sold over a million copies, 'paradigm shift' entered ordinary speech, and the social sciences, humanities and business all borrowed it. Philosophers accused him of reducing science to irrational 'mob psychology', and at a London conference in 1965 he debated Popper, Lakatos and Feyerabend in a famous exchange. He answered with a Postscript, splitting 'paradigm' into 'disciplinary matrix' and 'exemplar' and insisting he was no relativist: there are reasons for choosing paradigms, only no algorithm.

He moved to Princeton in 1964 and to MIT in 1979, wrote a history of black-body radiation and the quantum revolution, and spent his last thirty years on a philosophical work about incommensurability and change in scientific vocabulary, revised repeatedly and unfinished at his death. He disliked most of what 'Kuhnians' made of him, saying 'I am not a Kuhnian'. He died of lung cancer. His book changed how people talk about science and remains the starting point of every discussion of scientific change.

Key Ideas

Paradigm

The exemplars, theory, methods and standards a scientific community shares, which decide what counts as a problem and a solution. Without a paradigm there is no normal science.

Normal science

Most scientific activity is puzzle-solving within a paradigm, not testing it. Anomalies are usually set aside and shake belief only when they accumulate into crisis.

Scientific revolution

The replacement of one paradigm by another is non-cumulative: the new paradigm redefines problems, standards and the meanings of terms. After it scientists work in a different world.

Incommensurability

Old and new paradigms have no common measure; their terms cannot be fully translated, and the choice cannot be forced by neutral evidence. Not irrationality, but the absence of an algorithm.

Science without a goal

Science, like biological evolution, develops from its past rather than toward a goal. We may say its problem-solving power grows; we cannot say it draws nearer to truth.