Explanation and understanding
We explain nature; we understand the life of the mind. The human sciences have their own method and need not imitate physics.
The Nineteenth Century · 1833 – 1911
狄尔泰
Founder of the human sciences: nature is to be explained, spirit to be understood; life can be grasped only from within life, and hermeneutics became philosophy.
We explain nature, but we understand the life of the mind.
Source: Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology (1894)
Dilthey was the son of a Reformed pastor on the Rhine, meant to follow his father, who studied theology at Heidelberg and Berlin, turned to philosophy and history, took his doctorate in 1864, taught at Basel, Kiel and Breslau, and in 1882 succeeded Lotze in the Berlin chair, which he held until his death. He wrote the biography of Schleiermacher, edited Kant's works and studied the whole intellectual history of Germany from the Renaissance to the Romantics, but his main philosophical project remained unfinished all his life.
His problem came from the nineteenth-century situation: the natural sciences had triumphed, positivism wanted to apply their method to history and society, and the historical school insisted on the uniqueness of every age. Dilthey sought a foundation for history and the humanities as firm as that of natural science but different in kind. The first volume of the Introduction to the Human Sciences (1883) proposed that the natural sciences 'explain' phenomena from outside by causal laws, while the human sciences 'understand' expressions by re-living from within the life they express.
Understanding is possible because the human being is itself a historical being: it experiences, expresses and understands, and the three form a circle. 'Life' is the ultimate reality; it cannot be grasped by metaphysics, only understood through its own manifestations, in deeds, writings, institutions and art, which make up 'objective spirit'. Biography is the prototype of understanding and autobiography its most direct form. Late in life he broadened Schleiermacher's hermeneutics from a technique for interpreting texts into the methodology of all the human sciences.
He also proposed a 'typology of worldviews': naturalism, the idealism of freedom and objective idealism are three basic worldviews, each rooted in an attitude of life, so that the conflicts among philosophical systems cannot be settled by logic. This relativist conclusion troubled him. His influence came after his death: Husserl's life-world, Heidegger's historicity, Gadamer's hermeneutics and the sociology of Weber and Mannheim all start from him. The image he left among his students was of a man forever beginning and never finishing.
We explain nature; we understand the life of the mind. The human sciences have their own method and need not imitate physics.
Life expresses itself, and understanding is re-living another's life through its expressions. This circle is the structure of all humanistic knowledge.
Humanity has no fixed nature; what it is, only history tells it. The one who understands history is a historical being.
The art of interpreting texts can be broadened into a general method for understanding all human expression, giving the human sciences their foundation.
Philosophical systems arise from basic attitudes of life and are therefore always plural. No final system can adjudicate among them.
His lifelong project was a 'Critique of Historical Reason': what Kant had done for the natural sciences he would do for the human sciences.
Mill wanted to apply inductive logic to the 'moral sciences'; Dilthey thought the road was wrong: understanding people and explaining nature are two different kinds of knowing.
His late concept of the 'life-world' conceded Dilthey's historicity: science rests on the pre-scientific, lived world.
He inherited Dilthey's programme of extending hermeneutics to all the human sciences, but criticised him for still seeking an objective method for understanding.