The legitimacy of prejudice
Without prejudice there is no understanding. We come from tradition and read with it; the point is not to eliminate prejudices but to let the text test them.
The Twentieth Century to Today · 1900 – 2002
伽达默尔
Philosophical hermeneutics: understanding is not a method but the human way of being, prejudice is its condition, and truth happens in the fusion of horizons and in dialogue with tradition. He lived to a hundred and two.
Being that can be understood is language.
Source: Truth and Method, part 3
Gadamer was born in Marburg to a chemistry professor who despised the humanities; he studied classics and philosophy at Breslau and Marburg all the same. He took his doctorate under Natorp in 1922 with a thesis on Plato, contracted polio the same year and read Heidegger's manuscripts from his sickbed. In 1923 he went to Freiburg to study with Heidegger, became his assistant when Heidegger moved to Marburg, and qualified to teach in 1929 with Plato's Dialectical Ethics. Heidegger told him: if you cannot surpass me in scholarship, become a philologist.
Under the Nazis he neither joined the party nor resisted, taught as an unsalaried professor at Marburg, took a chair at Leipzig in 1939, was appointed rector of Leipzig by the Soviet authorities after the war, moved to Frankfurt in 1947 and in 1949 succeeded Jaspers at Heidelberg, where he taught until retirement in 1968 and went on lecturing for thirty years more. He taught and wrote in the manner of dialogue, seldom at length, and published his major work only at sixty.
Truth and Method appeared in 1960. Its question: what kind of truth do the human sciences have? The answer: not one that comes from method, but from the event of understanding. A work of art draws its viewer in as a game draws in its players; one always understands a text with one's own prejudices, which are not obstacles but the conditions from which understanding begins, and the Enlightenment's 'prejudice against prejudice' is itself a prejudice; understanding happens when the interpreter's horizon fuses with the text's; temporal distance is not a gulf to be crossed but the medium in which meaning shows itself; understanding is always application, as a judge applies the law to a case; its model is dialogue, the logic of question and answer; and all understanding takes place in language, for 'being that can be understood is language'.
The book provoked two famous debates: Habermas argued that hermeneutics ignored the distortion of tradition by ideology and needed the supplement of critical theory; Derrida, meeting him in Paris in 1981, questioned whether the 'good will' to understand was itself metaphysical. In old age he wrote on poetics, medicine and Plato and conversed across the world, keeping friendships with Habermas, Derrida, Rorty and Ricoeur. He lived to a hundred and two, the gentlest and most dialogical of Heidegger's heirs.
Without prejudice there is no understanding. We come from tradition and read with it; the point is not to eliminate prejudices but to let the text test them.
Understanding is not climbing into the author's mind but the meeting and fusion of the interpreter's horizon with the text's, producing a meaning neither had alone.
Our understanding of a work has already been shaped by the history of its effects. To be aware of this is effective-historical consciousness.
To understand a text is to apply it to one's own situation, as law is applied to a case or scripture to a sermon. There is no pure understanding.
Being that can be understood is language. Language is not a tool but the medium in which we meet the world; the limits of understanding are the limits of language.
He met Heidegger at Freiburg in 1923 and said that from then on he 'knew what thinking was'. Truth and Method turned Heidegger's ontology of understanding into a hermeneutics of tradition, dialogue and application.
Both his doctorate and his habilitation were on Plato, and the structure of dialogue, question and answer in shared inquiry, became his model for all understanding.
He inherited Dilthey's programme of extending hermeneutics to all the human sciences, but criticised him for still seeking an objective method for understanding.
He joined Gadamer's hermeneutics with the 'suspicion' of structuralism and psychoanalysis, arguing that understanding must take the 'long route' through explanation, and that truth and method are dialectical rather than opposed.
The 1960s debate with Gadamer: hermeneutics accepts the authority of tradition, critical theory asks whether tradition has been distorted by power, and that debate defined his early position.